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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the influence of foreign operations and their financial disclosure on
earnings quality in terms of accounting conservatism (timely recognizing losses). In a large (7,311
corporate years) sample of U.S. corporations, we find earnings of firms with multinational
operations (MNCs) tend to be of lower quality and are reported less conservatively than those
without foreign operations (domestic firms). Further, by looking at the geographic segment
information disclosed by MNCs, we find that earnings conservatism gets improved if a MNC
reports “clean” segment information of foreign operations; wherein operating results of MNC are
broken down by geographic regions (continent or country) and reported separately. This study
has implications for monitoring foreign operations and regulations that may improve earnings
quality in the global economy.
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INTRODUCTION

T

his paper investigates the influence of foreign operations and their disclosures on earnings quality in
terms of accounting conservatism. We examine two related issues (1)
how foreign operations
influence earnings quality and (2) whether differences in foreign operations disclosure requirements
improve earnings quality. As such, this investigation is motivated by increasing attention to international operations
in the global economy, contradictory findings in the literature regarding foreign earnings, and a growing concern
about the effectiveness of disclosure requirements of foreign operations.
These issues are of interest because of the prevalence of MNCs and the impact on earnings quality of
foreign earnings on evaluations of the company’s current and future profitability. As shown in subsequent
descriptive analysis, only approximately 5% of U.S. listed firms are classified as domestic (without foreign
operations revenues); all other firms are classified as multinational corporations (MNCs, or firms with foreign
operations revenues). Several studies examine the contribution of foreign operations to the firm value; however,
those studies offer contradictory results. For example, some researchers argue that investors value foreign earnings
significantly more than they do domestic earnings (Bodnar & Weintrop, 1997; Errunza & Senbet, 1984; Morck &
Yeung, 1991), whereas others find opposite results (Boatsman, Behn, & Patz, 1993; Christophe & Pfeiffer, 2002,
2000; Denis, Denis, & Yost, 2000). These studies contribute to the debate about how foreign operations are reflected
in the firm value, but that is just one aspect of the quality of foreign earnings (forecasting roles) perceived by
investors. This investigation attempts to examine earnings quality of foreign operation from the aspect of its
contracting roles, measured by timely reporting of economic losses (conservatism). This may restrain management’s
opportunistic behavior in reporting earnings and function as a means to address moral hazard problems (Watts,
2003).
By considering the practice of conservatism in earnings, foreign operations may influence earnings quality
in alternative ways. On the one hand, earnings of multinational corporations (MNCs) may be more conservative or
timelier in reporting losses occurred in foreign operations. Due to differences in laws, tax policies, languages, and
local competition, overseas operations tend to be more difficult to control and suffer more risks and uncertainty
(Christophe, 2002; Eaker, Fabozzi, & Grant, 1996; Jensen, 1986). However, managers can meet these challenges to
some extent, if they act conservatively and recognize “bad news” more readily than “good news.” On the other hand,
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earnings in MNCs may be less conservative because foreign operations embody the moral hazard problems. Foreign
operations, because of their potential for free cash flow, (Jensen, 1986; Pacter, 1993) often provide a desirable outlet
for suboptimal investments with negative project value With more free cash flow available for spending at their
discretion, managers may be motivated to introduce more bias and noise into the earnings and cause earnings to be
less informative to contracting parties. In addition, the monitoring of managerial decision-making can be more
difficult in a complex, globally diversified firm (Bodnar et al., 1999). Hence, moral hazard problems embodied in
foreign operations and control costs result in poorer earnings quality.
With these conflicting views, this study applies the piecewise linear model (Basu, 1997) to measure
earnings conservatism and uses a sample obtained from CRSP during fiscal year 1998–2006 to test the influence of
foreign operations on earnings quality. The empirical results show that earnings of firms that have international
operations (i.e., MNCs) generally are less conservative than those without international operations, suggesting
earnings quality is poorer in firms with foreign operations and potentially the predominance of moral hazard
problems.
Faced with potential moral hazard problems, which may have resulted in poorer foreign earnings quality,
regulators in the U. S. in fact have set disclosure requirements on foreign operations (Berger et al 2003; Herrmann et
al 2000; Lobo et al 1998)). For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires firms with
international operations to disclose components of their income (loss) before income tax expenses (benefit) as either
domestic or foreign [Regulation 210.4-08(h), General Notes to Financial Statements–Income Tax Expense]. SFAS
No. 14, issued and effective since 1976, requires companies to disclose operating information (sales, operating profit,
and assets) for their foreign operations if either revenue from foreign operations exceeds 10 percent of consolidated
revenue, or foreign assets exceeds 10 percent of consolidated assets. In addition, if a firm has significant foreign
operations in more than one geographic area, then the firm must disclose the foreign operating information for each
region separately. SFAS No. 131, issued and effective since the end of 1997, requires that disaggregated information
be presented based on how management internally evaluates the operating performance of its business units. In
accordance with the objectives and basic principles of SFAS No. 131, the standards allow multiple operating
segments to be combined into one operating segment if the operating segments have “similar” economic and basic
characteristics. While SFAS No. 131 would largely eliminate the geographic disclosure requirements previously
mandated under SFAS No. 14, it requires that segment information should be reported to external users in the same
manner as reported internally (Berger et al. 2002).
However, doubts arise regarding whether the disclosure of foreign operations could improve the usefulness
of earnings for forecasting firm value (Ahadiat, 1993; Boatsman et al. 1993; Chrisophe et al. 2002; Behn et al. 2002).
The effect of financial disclosure on the foreign earnings quality is still unclear in prior studies. By examining the
specific disclosure of foreign operations in CRSP dataset, we classify the disclosure of foreign operations into “clean”
and “dirty” disclosures. “Clean” disclosure means that the data reported by the MNC is broken out separately for
each geographic region, continent or country, in which the firm operates and creates sales revenues. “Dirty”
disclosure means that the data reported by the MNC is aggregated or mixed or not disclosed for geographic regions.
We argue that earnings quality is improved (more conservative) if the disclosure of foreign operations is clean. This
implies that the specific financial disclosures would mitigate the moral hazard problems reflected in foreign
operations reporting and therefore improve earnings quality.
Several compelling reasons prompt this investigation. First, few studies examine the contracting roles of
earnings in MNCs affected by foreign operations which embody manager’s opportunistic behavior. As known,
international trade and the global capital market have risen rapidly, increasing both the number of MNCs and their
influences considerably. In the past decade, a steady stream of research has examined foreign earnings quality
from the perspective of “value-relevance” which measures quality according to the impact on investors’ valuation
(e.g., Bodnar & Weintrop, 1997; Boatsman et al., 1993; Christophe, 2002; Morck & Yeung, 1991). Findings
remained mixed. However, having realized that the manager’s incentives ultimately shape earnings quality recent
literature (Ball, Robin, & Wu, 2003; Brown & Higgins, 2001; Bushman & Piotroski, 2006), considers conservative
reporting in terms of the timeliness of recognizing economic loss in accounting income to measure earnings quality.
This could reflect managers’ practices in accounting for contracting efficiency and contain managers’ opportunistic
behavior (Ball, Kothari, & Robin, 2000; Ball & Shivakumar, 2006; Basu, 1997; Watts, 2003). Hence, exploring
foreign earnings from this angle should contribute to a better understanding and assessment of accounting
information quality of foreign operations.
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Second, how to monitor foreign operations through financial reporting is a crucial issue (Ahadiat, 1993;
Boatsman et al. 1993; Chrisophe et al. 2002; Behn et al. 2002). Driven by the needs to monitor and improve the
quality of foreign earnings, regulators implement requirements for disclosures of foreign operation. Prior studies
have not resolved the issue of whether the disclosure requirement could mitigate the moral hazard problems and
improve earnings quality of foreign operations. This study contributes to both literature and regulation by providing
evidence on effectiveness of financial disclosure regulations which exert influence on foreign earnings reporting. In
the following sections of this article, we develop hypotheses, describe the sample and research design, discuss the
results and offer our conclusions.
Hypothesis Development
Foreign operations encompass countries from around the world, with drastically different economic
conditions, political structures, competitive forces, growth opportunities, and governmental regulations. Given
existing arguments about foreign operations, several perspectives relate to their influences on the earnings quality of
MNCs if manager’s reporting incentives are considered.
On the one hand, earnings may be of higher quality (i.e., more conservative) under the effect of foreign
operations because higher earnings quality is efficient for contracting parties (investors, creditors, auditors, and other
users) and helps mitigate shareholder litigation (Basu, 1997; Watts, 2003), with higher uncertainty or risk in foreign
operations. Foreign operations may represent underexploited, high-growth investment opportunities that can result
in greater returns and risks (Bodnar & Weintrop, 1997; Errunza & Senbet, 1984; Morck & Yeung, 1991). Overseas
operations also are more difficult to control and suffer more risks or uncertainty because of differences in laws, tax
policies, languages, and competition (Christophe, 2002; Eaker et al., 1996; Jensen, 1986). Therefore, if managers act
conservatively and practice accounting conservatism, they can somewhat compensate for the negative impact of risk
and uncertainty in foreign operations. Conservatism also offsets the managerial biases in financial reporting that get
introduced by uncertainty in foreign operations and increases the earnings quality used by various contracting parties
(Watts, 2003).
On the other hand, earnings may be of lower quality (i.e., less conservative) under the effect of foreign
operations because of the moral hazard problems embodied in foreign operations. Foreign operations can offer
desirable outlets for suboptimal investments, motivated by free cash flow availability (Jensen, 1986; Pacter, 1993).
Therefore, foreign operations may represent suboptimal investments with a negative net present value (NPV),
undertaken primarily for the benefit of management (Christophe, 2002). Untimely (late) loss recognition – deferring
recognition until the reduced cash flows underlying the negative NPV are realized – is more likely to pass the
negative earnings consequences on to subsequent generations of managers. Untimely loss recognition also provides
managers with an accounting-based incentive to continue operating negative cash-flow investments and strategies,
in order to avoid booking losses on sales or abandonment of assets. The moral hazard problems might result in less
conservative earnings or poorer contracting roles of earnings.
Prior studies suggest that the moral hazard hypothesis may play a dominant role in the MNCs of U. S.
corporations. Brown (2001) provided empirical evidence that U.S. managers are relatively more likely to manage
earnings surprises to create small positive profit surprises, as a result of information asymmetry caused by widely
dispersed ownership. In addition, monitoring of managerial decision-making can be more difficult in a complex,
globally-diversified firm (Bodnar et al., 1999). Hence, it is hypothesized as:
H1(a): Earnings in MNCs with foreign operations are of lower quality or less conservative than those in firms
without foreign operations.
H1(b): For the earnings in MNCs, the foreign component is of lower quality or less conservative than the domestic
component.
Attempting to strengthen monitoring to potential moral hazard problems occurring in foreign operations,
regulators implement the disclosure requirements for reporting foreign operations. For example, the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has issued and implemented SFAS No. 14 requirement since 1976; SFAS No.
131 has been issued and implemented since the end of 1997; SEC implements Regulation 210.4-08(h); etc.
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Our second research question examines whether disclosure requirement improves earnings quality because
the effectiveness of segment disclosure of foreign operations is of concern and it is controversial in prior literature
regarding whether it facilitates the increased firm value or improved monitoring (Ahadiat, 1993; Boatsman et al.
1993; Behn et al. 2002; Chrisophe et al. 2002). Some argue that specific disclosure may increase transparency of
foreign operation by enabling investors to assess the nature of all segment information and monitor managers’
discretion (Piotroski, 1999, 2002). Increased transparency of information enforces monitoring of external users and
mitigates manager’s discretion so that the earnings are reported more conservatively to reduce litigation risks.
Others argue financial disclosure, which also contains managers’ discretion, may not facilitate improved monitoring,
and might even result in inferior information content in certain contexts. For example, where firms have declining
liquidity, competitive harm created by disclosure is smaller (Botosan, et al. 2000; Cooke et al 1990; Leuz, 1999).
From these arguments, surfaces an empirical question whether the financial disclosure is effective in
increasing earnings quality. We conjecture that mandating the disclosure requirement might result in superior
information content because the regulators insist on increasing disclosure requirements and encourage firms to
disclose as many details as they can in their reports. Therefore, we examine it as follows:
H2:

Earnings quality in MNCs increases or is more conservative with specific disclosure of foreign operations.

Sample and Research Design
There are a number of different that could be employed to measure the firm’s foreign operations. We have
chosen to use foreign sales as our metric because we feel it is least susceptible to reporting distortions which might
arise when a firm engages in transfer pricing for its foreign operations. We also perform our tests using alternative
metrics to measure the foreign operations. For example, we use foreign assets to measure foreign operations. We
also use foreign operating income to measure foreign operations and find that the results are insignificant. Perhaps,
this is because companies are allowed wide discretion in how they report this figure which is exposed to more
reporting distortions.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Sample of Firms 1998 – 2006
Descriptive Statistics for the Sample of Firms Studied (Including Both Domestic Firms and Multinational
Corporations (MNCs)
Domestic Firms (Mean)
MNCs
Difference
(Mean)
(t-value)
Total Assets (data6 – MM$)
2776.0
4376.9
-1600.9
(-1.90*)
Total Sales (data12 – MM$)
1498.1
3440.4
-1942.3
(-5.51***)
EPS (data58)
0.25
0.76
-0.51
(-4.86***)
Net Income (data 172 – MM$)
373.9
224.6
149.3
(-1.35)
Return (RET)
0.22
0.15
0.07
(1.69*)
Abnormal Return (ABRET)
0.02
0.00
0.02
(0.51)
Bad News (RET < 0)
0.42
0.47
-0.05
(-2.00**)
Obs. #
338
7311
Panel A:

Panel B: Descriptive statistics for the sample of 7,311 MNCs
Domestic Operations
(Mean)
Net Income (MM$)
90.55
Sales (MM$)
3944.00
EPS
0.39
Frequency of loss (NI<0)
0.34
Obs. #
7311
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Foreign Operations
(Mean)
101.27
1716.30
0.40
0.25
7311

Total
(Mean)
224.6
3440.4
0.76
0.78
7311
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The accounting and stock return data for this study were extracted from annual CRSP files from 1998 to
2006. We use the CRSP/COMPUSTAT merged database, for which the final data cut is July 2007 (fiscal year
2006). SFAS No. 131, the newest disclosure requirement on the foreign operations, was issued by FASB in June
1997 and has been implemented since December of 2007. Hence, we choose the period studied from 1998 to 2006
(fiscal year) in order to exclude the effect of the issuance event. The segment data (e.g., foreign sales data, segment
region) were collected from the CRSP segment database.
The initial sample was selected after deleting the missing values, top and bottom 1% of outliers, and
financial/utility institutions (standard industrial classification codes 4999–6999). We also exclude the non-U.S.
incorporated firms so that the sample includes only U.S. incorporated firms. The final sample therefore consists of
7649 firm years, including 7311 firm years for MNCs and 338 firm years for U.S. domestic firms.
Table 1 (panel A) provides descriptive statistics and includes data for domestic firms without foreign
operations and for firms with foreign operations (MNCs). Firms with international or foreign operations (MNCs)
seem to hold larger-scale operations than the domestic firms, whether comparing their total assets, sales or
profitability. Cumulative CRSP monthly return in the fiscal year t is calculated for each firm year, and then the
returns of domestic firms and MNCs are compared. Market performance of domestic firms is a bit better than that of
MNCs (difference is 0.07 and t-value 1.69). In addition, MNCs have more “Bad News”, and lower return,
comparing to domestic firms (difference is - 0.05 and t-value -2.00).
Table 1 (panel B) also provides data for only those firms with international or foreign operations (MNCs),
describing the distribution of their decomposed foreign and domestic operations. On average, these firms tend to
depend more on domestic sales than on foreign sales, whereas the profitability of foreign operations is higher than
profitability of domestic operations. According to the definitions provided by Callen et al (2004), the component of
earnings from foreign operations is computed as:
Foreign earnings = Pretax foreign income (DATA 273) – Foreign income taxes
(Foreign income taxes = Taxes payable (DATA64) + Foreign deferred taxes (DATA 270).
The component of earnings from domestic operations is then computed as:
Domestic earnings = Pretax domestic income (DATA 272) – Domestic income taxes
(Domestic income taxes = Total income taxes (DATA16) – Foreign income taxes).
Foreign earnings average $101.27 MM and the domestic earnings average $90.55 MM.
earnings) is more likely to occur in domestic operations than in foreign operations.

A loss (negative

Table 2 presents the number of MNCs that have various disclosures of foreign operations. By manually
identifying the geographic regions reported by U. S. MNCs in their segment reports (CRSP dataset), we classify
those disclosures of foreign operations into four levels. If the MNC does not disclose the geographic regions, it is
classified as “No Disclosure”. For example, if a firm reports operating results as “Not reported”, “Foreign”,
“International”, or “All others”, then it is placed to the level of “No Disclosure”. If the MNC reports the geographic
regions (continental, country or city level) combined, it is classified as “Aggregated”. For example, if a firm
reported results for “Europe” and “Asia” combined, the company is classified as “Aggregated”. If the data reported
by the MNC is broken out separately for each continent, then it is classified as “Continental”, e.g. a firm reported
results for “Europe” and “Asia” separately. If the data reported by the MNC is broken out separately for each
country, then it is classified as “Country” (e.g. a firm reports results for “Japan” and “China” separately). Since one
of the purposes of this research is to examine whether the disclosure of foreign operations improves earnings quality,
we define a variable “Clean” to identify MNCs reported clean information for each geographic region which is
classified as either “Continental” or “Country” above. As presented in Table 2, more than 50 percent of MNCs report
clean information, 16 percent of MNCs do not disclose the specific geographic regions and only three percent of
MNCs disclosed aggregated results.
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1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Total
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Number of Firms and Disclosures of Foreign Operations of MNCs Sample 1998-2006
Disclosure of foreign operations
MNCs
Not disclosed
Aggregated
Continental
Country
902
93
132
347
330
765
118
26
232
389
783
128
14
222
419
757
117
16
216
408
750
121
9
206
414
788
130
10
210
438
864
137
11
234
482
891
150
9
259
473
811
153
11
216
431
7311
1147
238
2142
3784

Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the MNCs at four levels of disclosure. The MNC’s that disclose
clean information have more total sales, foreign sales, assets and profits. According to SFAS No. 14, companies
should disclose operating information (sales, operating profit, and assets) for their foreign operation if either revenue
from foreign operations exceeds 10 percent of consolidated revenue, or foreign assets exceeds 10 percent of
consolidated assets. For firms identified as “Not Disclosed” in Table 3, foreign sales occupy 70 percent of total sales
on average, far exceeding the 10 percent criterion.
Table 3:
Total Sales (data 12 – MM$)
Total Assets (data 6 – MM$)
Net Income (data 172 – MM$)
EPS (data 58)
Domestic Sales
Foreign Sales
Domestic Income
Foreign Income
Return (RET)
Bad (RET<0)
No. of Firms

Descriptive Statistics for the MNCs by Disclosure Level
Disclosure of foreign operations
Not disclosed
Aggregated
Continental
3283.13
2651.79
3598.07
4424.10
2781.51
4592.30
127.35
142.74
196.03
0.72
1.10
0.75
5232.38
3744.83
5281.41
2291.42
1594.68
3536.41
72.53
95.00
81.09
61.36
31.63
118.64
0.14
0.03
0.14
0.45
0.55
0.49
1147
238
2142

Country
3448.51
4340.98
215.79
0.75
6187.39
3300.68
101.09
107.93
0.17
0.46
3784

We use a piecewise linear model (Basu, 1997) to examine conservatism under the influence of foreign
operations. Even though market returns constitute a potentially noisy measure of economic losses that trigger
accounting accruals, this proxy has been the most popular for testing conservatism thus far (e.g., Ball & Shivakumar,
2006; Basu, 1997). The model follows:

EPS it
   1 * RETit   2 * BADit   3 * RETit * BAD it   4 * FOREIGN it
Pit 1
  5 * RETit * BADit * FOREIGN it   it

RETit is annual stock return, defined as cumulative CRSP monthly return in fiscal year t

BAD it is a proxy for bad news, which is equal to 1 if RETit  0 , 0 otherwise
RETit * BADit is the interaction item. Its coefficient (  3 ) implies the differential recognition of loss, which
indicates the degree of conditional conservatism.
Foreign it is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if a firm is a multinational corporation (MNC) with foreign or
international operations; otherwise, 0.

RETit * BADit * Foreignit is the interaction item. Its coefficient (  5 ) implies the earnings quality (conservatism)
interacted with the foreign operations.
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The same model as above is used to examine conservatism under the influence of disclosure of foreign
operations as follows.

EPS it
   1 * RETit   2 * BADit   3 * RETit * BADit   4 * CLEAN it
Pit 1
  5 * RETit * BADit * CLEAN it   it

RETit , BAD it and RETit * BADit are defined as above.

CLEAN it is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if a MNC discloses clean information or reports each geographic region
separately in which the firm operates; otherwise, 0.
RETit * BADit * CLEAN it is the interaction item. Its coefficient (
(conservatism) interacted with the specific disclosure of foreign operations.

5

) implies the earnings quality

RESULTS
For the sample of both domestic and international firms, our tests evaluate overall earnings quality under the
influence of international or foreign operations. First, we performed tests with the original Basu’s model. Results in
the first column of Table 4 show that overall earnings possess the attribute of conservatism (  3 is 0.26 and p
<.0001). Then, we test the model with interaction by foreign operations. Results in the second column of Table 4
support the moral hazard hypothesis in foreign operations, where foreign operations lowered the conservatism of
earnings or earnings quality. Specifically,  3 is significantly positive (0.41, p < .0001), which means that domestic
firms’ timeliness of incorporating losses vs. gains is more asymmetrical than that of MNCs. The significantly
negative  5 suggests a negative incremental effect of foreign operations on conservatism (-0.15, p = 0.001), such
that the speed with which firms with foreign operations recognize the loss is 0.26 (  3   5 : 0.41 – 0.15), slower or
less conservative than firms without foreign operations (0.41). Therefore, these findings support H1(a), which
states “Earnings in MNCs with foreign operations are of lower quality or less conservative than those in firms
without foreign operations.”
Table 4: Tests of Influence of Foreign Operations on Conservatism of Earnings
Basu’s (1997) Domestic and Multinational Corporations (MNCs)
EPS it
    1 * RETit   2 * BAD it   3 * RETit * BAD it   4 * FOREIGN it
Pit 1
  5 * RETit * BAD it * FOREIGN it   it

INTERCEPT
RET
BAD
RET*BAD

Dep. Var. (EPS)
0.03
(<.0001***)
-0.03
(<.0001***)
0.01
(0.040**)
0.26
(<.0001***)

FOREIGN
RET*BAD*FOREIGN
Adj R-Sq

0.07

Note: the number in parenthesis is p value. *** p < 1%, ** p < 5%, * < 10%.

EPS = earnings per share scaled by the price of previous year;
RET = the accumulated monthly return in a fiscal year;
BAD = 1 if RET <0; otherwise 0;
FOREIGN = 1 if foreign sale (FSALE) is not 0; otherwise 0.
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Dep. Var. (EPS)
0.01
(0.367)
-0.03
(<.0001***)
0.01
(0.037**)
0.41
(<.0001***)
0.02
(0.081*)
-0.15
(0.001***)
0.08
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Table 5 further decomposes the total earnings of firms with foreign operations (MNCs) into foreign and
domestic earnings to compare the quality of two components. Foreign earnings-per-share is less conservative (0.05,
p < .0001) than domestic earnings-per-share (0.20, p < .0001), although both recognize losses in a timely fashion. In
addition, the adjusted R-square of foreign earnings model (0.03) is lower than that of domestic model (0.06). Thus,
both the magnitude of the coefficient and the explanatory power of the regression model support the view that
foreign earnings are of lower quality than domestic earnings. Taken together, the results in Tables 4 and 5 indicate
that earnings with foreign operations get reported less conservatively and are of lower quality.
Table 5: Tests Comparing Conservatism of Two Components (7,311 MNCs)
Decomposed Foreign and Domestic Earnings from Basu’s (1997) model
EPSD it
    1 * RETit   2 * BAD it   3 * RETit * BAD it   it
Pit 1
EPSFit
    1 * RETit   2 * BAD it   3 * RETit * BAD it   it
Pit 1

INTERCEPT
RET
BAD
RET*BAD
Adj R-Sq

Dep. Var. (EPSD)
0.01
(<.0001***)
-0.03
(<.0001***)
0.01
(0.023***)
0.20
(<.0001***)
0.06

Dep. Var. (EPSF)
0.02
(<.0001***)
-0.001
(0.209)
0.00
(0.674)
0.05
(<.0001***)
0.03

Note: the number in parenthesis is p value. *** p < 1%, ** p < 5%, * < 10%.

EPSD = Domestic earnings divided by shares used for EPS calculation, scaled by the price of previous year;
EPSF = Foreign earnings divided by shares used for EPS calculation, scaled by the price of previous year;
RET = the accumulated monthly return in the fiscal year;
BAD = 1 if RET <0; otherwise 0.
The next test considers how earnings quality might be influenced by the disclosure of foreign operations. In
Table 6, firms with no foreign operations are deleted and the sample of MNCs is studied. The results in Table 6
suggest that “clean” disclosure of foreign operations has a significant and positive impact on the earnings quality,
because the incremental effect of “clean” disclosure of foreign operations on conservatism is positive. Specially,  3
is significantly positive (0.22, p < .0001), which means that earnings in firms which disclose clean information
incorporate the losses more timely than those disclose non-clean information. The significantly positive  5
suggests a positive incremental effect of “clean” disclosure on conservatism (0.04, p = 0.084), such that the speed
with which firms that report clean information of foreign operations recognize the loss is 0.26 (  3   5 : 0.22
+0.04), faster or more conservative than firms that disclose non-clean foreign operations (0.22).
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Tests of Influence of Foreign Operations Disclosure on Earnings Quality
Basu’s Model (1997)

EPS it
    1 * RETit   2 * BAD it   3 * RETit * BAD it   4 * CLEAN it
Pit 1
  5 * RETit * BAD it * CLEAN it   it

INTERCEPT
RET
BAD
RET*BAD
CLEAN
RET*BAD*CLEAN
Adj R-Sq

Dep. Var. (EPS)
0.03
(<.0001***)
-0.03
(<.0001***)
0.01
(0.034**)
0.22
(<.0001***)
0.005
(0.416)
0.04
(0.084*)
0.07

Note: the number in parenthesis is p value. *** p < 1%, ** p < 5%, * < 10%.

EPS = the total earnings in the MNCs, scaled by the price of previous year;
RET = the accumulated monthly return in the fiscal year;
BAD = 1 if RET <0; otherwise 0;
CLEAN = 1 if the data reported by the MNC is broken out separately for each geographic region, continent or
country, in which the firm operates and creates sales revenues; otherwise, 0 if the data reported by the MNC is
aggregated or mixed or not disclosed for geographic regions.
We perform some robustness checks using an adjusted Basu’s (1997) model. Some arguments arise in prior
studies regarding Basu’s model to test the conservatism of earnings (Ball et al. 2006; Givoly et al. 2004). Ball et al.
(2006) adjust Basu’s model by investigating the role of accrual accounting in the asymmetrically timely recognition
of unrealized gains and losses. We perform our tests according to their adjustment, using accruals as the dependent
variable, which is measured using cash flow (CF) model, Dechow-Dichev (DD) model or Jones model. The results
consistently support the hypothesis. Second, we perform the tests in which “bad news” is measured by negative
abnormal returns (firm returns minus market returns, < 0), or non-market proxies (cash flow from operations < 0).
The results still support the hypothesis.
CONCLUSIONS
Previous studies in this field investigated how investors perceive the magnitude of the foreign earnings of
MNCs in determining the firm value. Those studies provide mixed results. By considering the contracting role of
earnings in multinational corporations (MNCs), this study sheds new light on foreign earnings.. At the beginning of
this article, we argue that earnings quality is improved (more conservative) if the disclosure of foreign operations is
clean. Our findings support this argument. We find that “clean” disclosure (data reported by the MNC is broken out
separately for each geographic region, continent or country, in which the firm operates and creates sales revenues)
does improve earnings quality. In turn, these results call for greater monitoring mechanisms to watch for managers’
manipulations of foreign operations and increased vigilance by regulators in their efforts to uphold international
disclosures standards. This study also finds that foreign operations have a negative influence on earnings quality in
terms of conservatism. This result may reflect managers’ opportunistic behavior and affect the contracting role of
earnings
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